The paper is concerned with the variational formulation of the oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of both production and demand excesses. In particular, we generalize a previous model in which the authors, instead, considered only the problem with production excesses, by allowing also the presence of demand excesses. First we examine the equilibrium conditions in terms of the well-known dynamic Cournot-Nash principle. Next, the equilibrium conditions will be expressed in terms of Lagrange multipliers by means of the infinite dimensional duality theory. Then, we show the equivalence between the two conditions that are both expressed by an appropriate evolutionary variational inequality. Moreover, thanks to the variational formulation, some existence and regularity results for equilibrium solutions are proved. At last, a numerical example, which illustrates the features of the problem, is provided.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to introduce a time-dependent variational formulation for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium model in presence of both production and demand excesses. Moreover, in line with 1 , we want to eliminate the serious drawback present in 2 where the authors made the unreasonable assumption that the production of a given commodity could be unbounded, by making possible any commodity shipment from a firm to a demand market. This is not possible because the amount of a commodity that the producers can offer is limited as a consequence of finite resources. Therefore, it can happen that some of the amounts of the available commodity are sold out so that can occur an excess of demand, whereas for a part of the producers can occur an excess of production. The question about the unbounded production had already been solved in 1 , but the presence of both excesses realizes a more complete study of the problem. In order to clarify the presence of both production and demand excesses we consider some concrete economic situations. During an economic crisis period the presence of production excesses can be due to a demand decrease in demand markets and, on the other hand, the presence of demand excesses may occur when the supply cannot satisfy the demand especially for fundamental goods. Moreover, since the market model presented in this paper evolves in time, the presence of both production and demand excesses is a consequence of the fact that the physical transportation of commodity between a firm and a demand market is evidently limited, therefore, there can exist some time intervals in which some of the demand markets require more commodity, though some firms produce more commodity than they can send to all the demand markets. For these reasons the new model results in a more realistic generalization of the ones presented in 1, 2 , where the authors studied the case without presence of excesses and the case with the only presence of production excesses, respectively.
The equilibrium formulation fits in the light of a dynamic noncooperative behaviour. The first author who treated the most trivial example of noncooperative behaviour between two producers of a given commodity, nowadays called duopoly problem, was Cournot see 3 . Later Nash, in 4, 5 , extended this concept by introducing m agents in his model nowadays called noncooperative game, each acting according to his own self-interest.
In order to study the time-dependent behaviour of the model, we will afford this study by considering the evolution of the market in time and, as a consequence, all the variables present in this model, such as the costs, the commodity shipments, and the excesses depend on time. As Beckmann and Wallace pointed out, for the first time, in 6 , "the time-dependent formulation of equilibrium problems allows one to explore the dynamics of adjustment processes in which a delay on time response is operating." Of course a delay on time response always happens because the processes have not an infinite speed. Usually, such adjustment processes can be represented by means of a memory term which depends on previous equilibrium solutions according to the Volterra operator see, e.g., 7 . The time-dependent process was one of the main features of the paper 2 where, in particular, the authors studied the variational formulation and proved the existence and regularity of a dynamic equilibrium solution. Moreover, the regularity property allows to provide a computational procedure to compute the equilibrium solutions see, e.g., 8-12 . In 13 the authors, through the notion of quasi-relative interior of sets see 14 , applied the infinite dimensional duality results developed in [15] [16] [17] [18] to overcome the difficulty of the voidness of the interior of the ordering cone which defines the constraints of the problem and so proved the existence of Lagrange variables which permit to describe the behaviour of the market. Moreover, in 13 some sensitivity results have been obtained each of them showing that small changes of the solution happen in correspondence with small changes of the profit function. In 7, 19 , an oligopolistic market equilibrium model with an explicit long-term memory has been considered. Then, in 19 , the Lipschitz continuity of the solution, which depends on the variation rate of projections onto time-dependent constraints set, is shown and the existence of Lagrange multipliers is provided.
In the first part of the paper, we present the equilibrium conditions in presence of excesses according to the well-known Cournot-Nash principle. This is a practical equilibrium definition that expresses that each firm acts trying to maximize its own profit. The second one, more theoretical, is shown through the Lagrange variables that better emphasize, in particular, the presence of excess constraints. The equilibrium conditions established in terms Abstract and Applied Analysis 3 of Lagrange variables do not arouse any concern because we will prove that their presence is not influential in the definition of equilibrium because we can characterize such equilibrium conditions by means of an evolutionary variational inequality that does not contain the Lagrange variables. Another thing to notice is that the equilibrium conditions, provided with the help of the duality theory, are equivalent to the dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium principle because we can prove that they are both equivalent to the same evolutionary variational inequality. Such variational formulation gives us a powerful tool for the study of the existence, the regularity, and the calculus of equilibrium solutions. In particular, we show that the constraint set satisfies the property of set convergence in Kuratowski's sense which has an important role in order to guarantee the continuity of equilibrium solutions. Moreover, the continuity property is very useful in order to introduce a numerical scheme to compute equilibrium solutions see 20, 21 .
The outline of the paper is as the following. In Section 2, we describe the model of the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of both production and demand excesses and we show the equilibrium conditions making use of both CournotNash principle and Lagrange multipliers. In Section 3, we recall the new infinite dimensional duality theory requested to show the existence of Lagrange variables. In Section 4, after showing some preliminary lemmas, we give the proof of the characterization of the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium conditions established in terms of Lagrange variables by means of an evolutionary variational inequality, so we can derive their equivalence with the dynamic Cournot-Nash principle. In Section 5, after recalling some preliminary definitions, we give some existence results. Section 6 is devoted to provide a regularity result for the equilibrium solution after proving that the constraint set of commodity shipments satisfies the requirements of the set convergence in Kuratowski's sense. Finally, in Section 7, we provide a numerical example of a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of production and demand excesses and underline some important features of the problem.
Dynamic Oligopolistic Market Equilibrium
Let us consider m firms P i , i 1, . . . , m, that produce only one commodity and n demand markets Q j , j 1, . . . , n, that are generally spatially separated. Assume that the homogeneous commodity, produced by the m firms and consumed by the n markets, is involved during a time interval 0, T , T > 0. Let p i t , i 1, . . . , m, denote the nonnegative commodity output produced by firm P i at the time t ∈ 0, T . Let q j t , j 1, . . . , n, denote the nonnegative demand for the commodity at demand market Q j at the time t ∈ 0, T . Let x ij t , i 1, . . . , m, j 1, . . . , n, denote the nonnegative commodity shipment between the supply market P i and the demand market Q j at the time t ∈ 0, T . In particular, let us set the vector x i t x i1 t , . . . , x in t , i 1, . . . , m, t ∈ 0, T as the strategy vector for the firm P i . Finally, let us introduce the production and demand excesses. Let i t , i 1, . . . , m, be the nonnegative production excess for the commodity of the firm P i at the time t ∈ 0, T . Let δ j t , j 1, . . . , n, be the nonnegative demand excess for the commodity of the demand market Q j at the time t ∈ 0, T .
Let us group the production output into a vector-function p : 0, T → R m , the demand output into a vector-function q : 0, T → R n , the commodity shipments into a matrix-function x : 0, T → R mn , the production excess into a vector-function : 0, T → R m , and the demand excess into a vector-function δ : 0, T → R n .
Abstract and Applied Analysis
Let us assume that the following feasibility conditions hold: 
2.1
Hence, the quantity produced by each firm P i , at the time t ∈ 0, T , must be equal to the commodity shipments from that firm to all the demand markets plus the production excess, at the same time t ∈ 0, T . Moreover, the quantity demanded by each demand market Q j , at the time t ∈ 0, T , must be equal to the commodity shipments from all the firms to that demand market plus the demand excess, at the same time t ∈ 0, T . Furthermore, we assume that the nonnegative commodity shipment between the producer P i and the demand market Q j has to satisfy time-dependent constraints, namely, there exist two nonnegative functions x, x : 0, T → R mn such that
For technical reasons, let us assume that
As a consequence, we have
Then, the set of feasible 
2.5
Abstract and Applied Analysis 5 Furthermore, let us associate with each firm P i a production cost f * i , i 1, . . . , m, and assume that the production cost of a firm P i may depend upon the entire production pattern, namely:
Similarly, let us associate with each demand market Q j , a demand price for unity of the commodity d * j , j 1, . . . , n and assume that the demand price of a demand market Q j may depend upon the entire consumption pattern, namely:
Moreover, since we allow production excesses and, consequently, the storage of commodities, we must consider the function g * i , i 1, . . . , m, that denotes the storage cost of the commodity produced by the firm P i and assume that this cost may depend upon the entire production pattern, namely:
Finally, let c ij , i 1, . . . , m, j 1, . . . , n, denote the transaction cost, which includes the transportation cost associated with trading the commodity between firm P i and demand market Q j . Here we permit the transaction cost to depend upon the entire shipment pattern, namely:
Hence, we have the following mappings:
2.10
The 
2.12
Then, the equivalent constraint set becomes
x ij t ≤ q j t , ∀j 1, . . . , n, a.e. in 0, T .
2.13
We can observe that K includes the presence of both production and demand excesses described in K * .
Then, the production costs, the demand price, and the storage costs, by virtue of 2.12 and taking into account 2.6 , 2.7 , and 2.8 , become
2.14 and, analogously, the profit function 2.11 becomes 
2.17
Now let us consider the dynamic oligopolistic market, in which the m firms supply the commodity in a noncooperative fashion, each one trying to maximize its own profit function considered the optimal distribution pattern for the other firms, at the time t ∈ 0, T . We seek to determine a nonnegative commodity distribution matrix-function x for which the m firms and the n demand markets will be in a state of equilibrium as defined below. In fact, we can consider different, but equivalent, equilibrium conditions each of them illustrates important features of the equilibrium. The first one makes use of the dynamic Cournot-Nash principle see 2 .
Definition 2.1. x * ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium in presence of excesses if and only if for each i 1, . . . , m and a.e. in 0, T one has
where
With the same technique used in 2, Theorem 3.1 it is possible to prove that under the assumptions i , ii , iii on v i , Definition 2.1 is equivalent to an evolutionary variational inequality, as the following result shows.
Theorem 2.2. Let one suppose that assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) are satisfied. Then, x * ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium in presence of excesses according to Definition 2.1 if and only if it satisfies the evolutionary variational inequality
T 0 − m i 1 n j 1 ∂v i t, x * t ∂x ij x ij t − x 8
Abstract and Applied Analysis
In Section 4 we will prove that, under the assumptions i , ii , iii on the profit function v, Definition 2.1 is equivalent to the equilibrium conditions defined through Lagrange variables which are very useful in order to analyze the presence of both production and demand excesses.
Definition 2.3. x
* ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market problem equilibrium in presence of excesses if and only if, for each i 1, . . . , m, j 1, . . . , n and a.e. in 0,
The terms λ * ij t , ρ * ij t , μ * i t , ν * j t are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the constraints
They, as it is well known, have a topical importance on the understanding and the management of the market. In fact, at a fixed time t ∈ 0, T , we have: a if λ * ij t > 0 then, by using 2.22 , we obtain x * ij t x ij t , namely, the commodity shipment between the firm P i and the demand market Q j is minimum, 
Taking into account Theorems 2.2 and 2.4, the equivalence between Definitions 2.1 and 2.3 is proved.
Finally, we observe that also in the case in which the production is bounded and we are in presence of excesses, the meaning of Cournot-Nash equilibrium does not change.
Lagrange Theory
Let us present the infinite dimensional Lagrange duality theory which represents an important and very recent achievement see [16] [17] [18] . At first, we remember some definitions and then we give some duality results see 15-17 . Let X denote a real normed space, let X * be the topological dual of all continuous linear functionals on X, and let C be a subset of X. Given an element x ∈ Cl C , the set:
is called the tangent cone to C at x. If C is convex, we have see 23 :
where Cone C {λx : x ∈ C, λ ≥ 0}.
Following Borwein and Lewis 14 , we give the following definition of quasi-relative interior for a convex set.
Definition 3.1. Let C be a convex subset of X. The quasi-relative interior of C, denoted by qri C, is the set of those x ∈ C for which T C x is a linear subspace of X.
If we define the normal cone to C at x as the set:
the following result holds. Using the notion of qri C, in 17 , the following separation theorem is proved.
3.4
Vice versa, let one suppose that there exist ξ / θ X * and a point
Now, let us present the statement of the infinite dimensional duality theory. Let X be a real linear topological space and S a nonempty convex subset of X; let Y, · Y be a real normed space partially ordered by a convex cone C and let Z, · Z be a real normed space. Let f : S → R and g : S → Y be two convex functions and let h : S → Z be an affine-linear function.
Let us consider the problem
where K {x ∈ S : g x ∈ −C, h x θ Z }, and the dual problem
where C * {u ∈ Y * : u, y ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C} is the dual cone of C. We say that Assumption S is fulfilled at a point x 0 ∈ K if and only if it results in
where 
and the solution of the constraint optimization problem 3.5 see 16 . 
and, moreover, it results in u, g x 0 0. 3.11
Proof of Existence of Lagrange Variables
In this section, making use of the infinite dimensional Lagrange duality theory shown in Section 3, we will prove that equilibrium conditions 2.21 -2.25 can be equivalently expressed by the evolutionary variational inequality 2.20 . As a consequence, we determine under assumptions i , ii , iii on the profit function v, the equivalence with dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium conditions 2.18 . In order to prove Theorem 2.4, let us show some preliminary results. At first we recall Lemma 3.7 in 13 for the capacity constraints of the commodity shipments. 
4.7
Now, we remember Lemma 4.2 in 1 that holds when production excesses occur. 
x ij t − q j t dt ≥ 0.
4.13
Hence, we obtain 2.20 . Vice versa, let x * ∈ K be a solution to 2.20 and let us apply the infinite dimensional duality theory. First of all, let us prove that the Assumption S is fulfilled.
4.14 
4.17
Before starting with the proof let us observe the following:
and also
Moreover,
4.20
and, analogously,
4.21
Now we observe that, for 
4.22
As a consequence, we have 
is nonnegative.
Abstract and Applied Analysis
Taking into account Theorems 3.7 and 3.8, if we consider the Lagrange function,
4.28
4.30
Abstract and Applied Analysis 
4.32
22
Abstract and Applied Analysis and, hence, we obtain the equilibrium conditions according to Definition 2.3, namely:
for all i 1, . . . , m, j 1, . . . , n, a.e. in 0, T .
Existence Results
This section is devoted to show some results for the existence of solutions to the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of excesses. Let us recall some definitions see 24 . Let X be a reflexive Banach space, let K be a subset of X, and let X * be the dual space of X. is its duality mapping, where
We are able to show the following existence result.
Theorem 5.7. Let one set
5.5
If A is B-pseudomonotone or F-hemicontinuous, or assuming that A is K-pseudomonotone and lower hemicontinuous along line segments, then the variational inequality
admits a solution.
Abstract and Applied Analysis
Proof. Let us note that K is clearly a nonempty, closed, convex, and bounded subset of L 2 0, T , R mn , and, consequently, it is a weakly compact subset of L 2 0, T , R mn . Then, the claim is achieved by applying Theorems 2.6 and 2.7 and Corollary 3.7 in 24 .
Regularity Results
In the following, we want to establish conditions under which the solutions to the dynamic oligopolistic market problem with both production and demand excesses are continuous with respect to time.
Set Convergence
Let us remember the classical notion of convergence for subsets of a given metric space X, d , which was introduced in the 1950s by Kuratowski see 25 , see also 26, 27 . Let {K n } n∈N be a sequence of subsets of X. Let us remember that
where eventually means that there exists δ ∈ N such that x n ∈ K n for any n ≥ δ, and frequently means that there exists an infinite subset N ⊆ N such that x n ∈ K n for any n ∈ N in this last case, according to the notation given above, we also write that there exists a subsequence {x k n } n∈N ⊆ {x n } n∈N such that x k n ∈ K k n . Now, we are able to recall the Kuratowski's convergence of sets.
Definition 6.1. We say that the sequence {K n } n∈N converges to some subset K ⊆ X in Kuratowski's sense, and we briefly write K n → K, if and only if d−lim n K n d−lim n K n K. Thus, in order to verify that K n → K, it suffices to check that
We observe that the set convergence in Kuratowski's sense can also be expressed as follows.
Remark 6.2. Let X, d be a metric space and K a nonempty, closed, and convex subset of X. A sequence of nonempty, closed and convex sets K n of X converges to K in Kuratowski's sense, as n → ∞, that is, K n → K, if and only if K1 for any x ∈ K, there exists a sequence {x n } n∈N converging to x ∈ X such that x n lies in K n for all n ∈ N, K2 for any subsequence {x n } n∈N converging to x ∈ X such that x n lies in K n , for all n ∈ N, then the limit x belongs to K.
Abstract and Applied Analysis 25
The following lemma, that now we prove, assures that the feasible set K of the dynamic oligopolistic market problem in the presence of both production and demand excesses satisfies the property of the set convergence in Kuratowski's sense.
n , and let {t k } k∈N be a sequence such that t k ∈ 0, T , for all k ∈ N, and t k → t, with t ∈ 0, T , as k → ∞. Then the sequence of sets
for all k ∈ N, converges to
Proof. In the first part, we prove the condition K1 . Let {t k } k∈N be a sequence such that t k ∈ 0, T , for all k ∈ N, and t k → t, with t ∈ 0, T , as k → ∞. By virtue of the continuity of x, x, p, q, it follows that We remark
where is the production excess function. Then, there exists an index ν 2 such that for k > ν 2 we have
Moreover, we get 
6.19
Then, the proof of the condition K1 is completed. Now let us prove condition K2 . Let {t k } k∈N be a sequence such that t k ∈ 0, T , for all k ∈ N, and t k → t, with t ∈ 0, T , as k → ∞. Let {x t k } k∈N be a sequence, such that x t k ∈ K t k , for all k ∈ N, and converging to x t , as k → ∞. We need to prove that x t ∈ K t .
Since x t k ∈ K t k , for all k ∈ N, it results in 6.20
Passing to the limit as n → ∞ and taking into account the continuity assumption on the functions x, x, p, q, we obtain x ij t ≤ x ij t ≤ x ij t , ∀i 1, . . . , m, ∀j 1, . . . , n, x ij t ≤ q j t , ∀j 1, . . . , n.
6.21
As a consequence x t ∈ K t , and, hence, the condition K2 is achieved.
Continuity Theorems for Equilibrium Solutions
In order to show the continuity result for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium solution in presence of both production and demand excesses, we present the following result see e.g., 2, Corollary 3.1 . x ij t ≤ q j t , ∀j 1, . . . , n .
6.23
The continuity of solutions to evolutionary variational inequalities with respect to time under the only assumption of continuity on the data has been proved in several papers see for instance [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Now, in our case, by applying Theorem 4.2 in 12 and taking into account Lemma 6.3, we obtain the following result. 
Numerical Example
Let us present a numerical example about the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of both production and demand excesses.
As a consequence, the feasible set is 
